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This chapter examines the pricing, demand (occupancy), and revenue per 
available room (RevPAR) dynamics of European hotels for the period 2006-2007. The 
importance of understanding the pricing behavior of direct competitors is critical to 
effective strategy formulation and meaningful industry analysis. Nevertheless, existing 
demand studies miss a critical link to local market dynamics. This study offers an 
alternative approach to examining competitive set pricing behavior that yields insights 
into the inelasticity of lodging demand. The results of this study of over 3,000 European 
hotel observations reveal that hotels that offered average daily rates (ADRs) above those 
of their direct competitors had lower comparative occupancies but higher relative 
RevPARs. The observed pattern of demand and revenue behavior was consistent for 
hotels in all market segments from luxury to economy. Country-specific analyses reveal a 
similar pattern, with more volatility in the results for hotels in Spain and Italy. Overall, 
the results suggest that the best way for a hotel to have higher revenue performance 
than its competitive group is to maintain higher rates. The results of this study support 
the position that hotel operators who resist pressures to undercut competitor’s prices 
may be better served with higher revenues. 
Introduction 
What is the effect on a hotel’s performance when it chooses to price higher or lower 
than other hotels in its competitive group? A competitor’s decision to drop or raise rates is a 
key factor in how a hotel prices its own products. Who is most successful in the market, the 
player who sets their prices above those of the competition or the one who offers lower prices? 
Competitive pricing plays an important role in both performance and strategy formulation of a 
hotel (Schwartz, 2006). Indeed, pegging prices to a competitor’s prices is a common practice in 
the industry, as is setting price based on costs (Sahay, 2007). The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore what happens to revenue per available room (RevPAR) when a hotel sets its price 
higher or lower than the prices of the group of direct competitor hotels. 
Industry analysis that includes a systematic examination of direct competitor 
performance is a key element of strategy formulation and has only seen limited use in the 
lodging industry, primarily in the United States where data gathering until recently was more 
comprehensive and available to academics (Canina & Enz, 2006). In the European lodging 
industry, in particular, gathering market data on direct competitors in multiple markets and 
conducting empirical performance comparisons are necessary to understand pricing strategies. 
As a result, the main objective of this study is to explore pricing strategies of competitive hotels 
in Europe by examining both hotel segments (e.g., luxury, mid-priced, and budget) and specific 
country dynamics (e.g., United Kingdom, German, Italy, Sweden, and Germany). In addition, 
this study advances an approach to understanding lodging demand that offers more meaningful 
competitive comparisons than the traditional demand-based economic models currently offer. 
Why some competitors drop their prices and why others follow is of vital importance to 
strategic leaders, particularly during economically challenging times when demand drops and 
cost pressures mount. Reference pricing is when a hotel prices with its competitors in mind and 
typically with the goal of enhancing revenue by stimulating greater demand for their products. 
Consumers frequently engage in reference pricing as well when comparing two competing 
hotels at a given point in time and when comparing current prices to prior pricing experiences. 
The underlying premise is that consumers do not respond to absolute prices, but to prices 
relative to the reference price (Thaler, 1985). The reference prices used in these comparisons 
may be contextual or temporal. Jacobson and Obermiller (1990) found that reference prices 
were contextual such that a brand’s expected price was determined primarily by its current 
price and those of other brands. 
Research has identified various factors that shape pricing decisions including cost, value, 
and elasticity (Stibel, 2007; Canina & Enz, 2006). The idea that prices depend mainly on the 
costs of labor and materials suggests that firms delay price increases until costs rise. During 
slow demand periods, businesses may delay price reductions for the same reason. The cost-
based pricing perspective is not new and argues that prices react to costs with a lag (Gordon, 
1981). However, service firms such as hotels have shorter production cycles and thus may have 
shorter lags in cost-based price adjustment. Nevertheless, hotel operators realize that cost has 
little to do with a customer’s willingness to pay and only shapes the pricing floor or minimum 
price necessary. Customers are willing to pay a given price for a hotel on the basis of the value 
they believe they will get. For example, Gupta (1988) found that price discounts had only a 
small effect on consumers’ timing and quantity of purchases but a strong effect on brand 
choice. Price differences led consumers to switch brands more than change how much or when 
they buy. 
Other theorists have suggested that during business downturns, companies lose their 
least loyal customers first and retain their most loyal (Blinder, Elie, Canetti, Lebow, & Rudd, 
1998). It is these loyal customers that are not sensitive to price, thus discounting will not 
stimulate revenues. Another view suggests that customers view price as an indication of 
quality, and thus, lowering prices may signal a reduction in quality. The view that loyal 
customers are not price sensitive appears to be stronger in manufacturing industries, while the 
view that customers judge quality by price appears to be stronger for service firms (Blinder et 
al., 1998). Both views would suggest that price reductions may harm the businesses that deploy 
the strategy. According to these two views, value pricing (lowering rate) to satisfy customers’ 
demand for a better deal can be extremely risky and is not a substitute for maintaining high 
quality (Hayes & Huffman, 1995). If dropping price can increase market share through larger 
volume, and the extra costs are less than the extra revenue (i.e., the profit margin is not 
shrinking), then discounting rates can improve revenues. This view assumes that demand is 
elastic and can be stimulated by changes in price. Of course, if discounting overtaxes the staff 
and facilities, the long-run benefit may be diminished. In the hotel business, this happens when 
extremely high levels of occupancy make it difficult to maintain the physical facility and put 
stress on staff to deliver consistent service quality. 
Despite the importance of understanding the impact of pricing decisions facing a firm in 
the lodging industry, there are few studies addressing this issue (for exceptions, see Hiemstra & 
Ismail, 1993; Canina & Enz, 2006; Canina & Carvell, 2005). Conventional wisdom and micro-
economic theory suggest that when prices fall, the quantity demanded for a given product will 
rise. This fundamental principle is based on the premise of the downward sloping demand 
curve (with price on the vertical and quantity on the horizontal axes). As prices fall, the quantity 
demanded will rise holding everything else constant. Falling prices and rising quantity 
demanded is thought to result in higher revenue, but this pattern of behavior may not in fact 
lead to revenue increases. Indeed, increased revenue depends on the price elasticity of 
demand. If lodging demand is price elastic, then as prices fall, revenue will increase. If lodging 
demand is price inelastic, then the percentage change in consumer demand is less than the 
percentage change in price. Under this situation, as prices for hotel rooms fall, revenue will fall 
because consumers will not significantly increase the quantity of hotel products they purchase 
enough to offset the price reduction. 
To determine how pricing decisions impact performance, estimates of the price 
elasticity of demand as well as other parameters are often required. By examining the few 
published studies, it is evident that various approaches exist for calculating demand elasticities. 
Furthermore, these analyses focus on the elasticity of demand for the lodging market as a 
whole, not the elasticities experienced by distinct countries, markets, or individual firms.1 
Outside of the lodging industry, academic researchers have frequently pursued methods to 
estimate price elasticity of market-level demand in various industries (Chung, 2006; Garcia & 
Tugores, 2006; Skuras, Petrou, & Clark, 2006). Unfortunately, the estimates produced in many 
studies have wide confidence intervals due to an array of complex empirical problems, and as a 
result, these studies do little to clarify demand conditions for those practicing managers who 
require guidance in establishing a pricing strategy. 
We propose an alternative to calculating demand elasticities, to focus on understanding 
the impact of individual hotel pricing decisions vis-a-vis direct competitors’ prices, revenues, 
and occupancies. By analyzing local hotel competitors’ relative occupancies and RevPARs in the 
context of comparative pricing behavior [e.g., percentage difference from competitor, average 
daily rates (ADRs)], our approach allows the exploration of the impact on demand and rooms 
revenue of pricing differences among hotels that directly compete in local markets. To prepare 
owners and operators for how to consider making wise strategic pricing decisions, this chapter 
examines the relationship between competitive pricing, demand, and RevPAR in various 
European countries during the period 2006-2007. 
Understanding relative pricing practices helps us move beyond the cost- plus approach 
to pricing, in which operators focused on their costs plus the addition of a markup. While 
incremental cost considerations are important to assure revenue maximization, pricing that 
takes into consideration the strategies of other competitors will be the focus of this study. Our 
goal is to understand relative pricing behavior of direct competitors. As a starting point for 
analysis, we focus on hotel rate setting in comparison to the pricing behavior of competing 
hotels. The study looks at hotels that price above and below their competitors and how these 
hotels compare on customer demand and overall rooms revenue. We acknowledge that cost 
and total revenue management issues are critical in making pricing decisions, but this 
investigation focuses only on issues of relative demand in competitive situations. Our decision 
to examine relative pricing behavior among competitors is due to the fact that many individual 
hotels are profoundly influenced by the actions of their direct competitors. If competing hotels 
in a local market drop prices often, owners and operators of comparative hotels feel pressure 
to follow these actions by dropping prices too in order to maintain parity with their competitive 
set and avoid losing demand share. 
Lodging Demand Literature 
A multitude of demand models and functional forms have been used in the literature 
(e.g., see, Chung, 2006; Garcia & Tugores, 2006; Skuras et al., 2006; Li, Song, & Witt, 2004). The 
outcomes from these studies vary widely due to factors such as differences in the choice of 
mathematical models, estimated functional forms, level of aggregation, consideration for time 
(e.g., time series vs. cross-sectional study design), and duration of the study (short run vs. long 
run) (Divisekera, 2003; De Mello, Pack, & Sinclair, 2002; Turner & Witt, 2001; Lim, 1997; Crouch, 
1992, 1994, 1995). The results from empirical studies on price elasticity of demand are 
disappointing as a result of the methodological flaws and varied operationalizations across 
studies. 
Economists have employed a wide array of approaches to estimating demand and 
supply for differentiated products such as hotels (Rosen, 1974). However, there is still no 
agreement as to the best way to estimate elasticities for products differentiated by several 
attributes. 
Many of those who estimate the impact of various factors on the demand for hotel 
room nights focus on aggregate room demand as measured by the total number of rooms sold 
across all U.S. markets at all price points. These models are usually estimated using average 
prices for properties with varying quality in different market segments, across geographical 
locations yielding single industry-wide own price elasticity estimates (Canter & Maher, 1998; 
Jogaratnam & Kwansa, 1990). These aggregate demand models estimate the price elasticity of 
demand for the lodging industry as a whole, but these estimates are not valid in evaluating 
pricing strategies at the property level. It is not meaningful to apply overall industry estimates 
of demand, supply, or price elasticity to a particular property or local market, just as you would 
not use average overall industry forecasts of occupancy and ADR as estimates in a local market. 
Occupancy and ADR are forecasted controlling for market segment, full and limited service, 
size, price range, and geographical location. Individual products’ attributes and their market 
position are required as inputs to the demand estimation procedure. In sum, aggregate demand 
estimates are of limited practical use to hotels facing property-specific demand and pricing 
challenges. Changing market conditions and uncertainty also render the estimates largely 
inaccurate or outdated over time, leading managers to steer clear of estimating demand curves 
when making pricing decisions. 
A few consulting and economic forecasting companies provide aggregate- level models 
of lodging demand and supply as forecasts of ADR and occupancy for various ranges of price, 
number of rooms, and broad categorizations of locations . These models are reestimated 
periodically to revise their estimates using the most recent industry data. However, estimates 
of the hotels’ own-price elasticity and cross-price elasticities are not published, and the 
consulting practices protect the details of their estimation methodology as proprietary 
information. 
In our review of lodging demand studies, no current research exits that provides an 
estimate of a system of supply and demand at the hotel property level that accounts for both 
local market competitive conditions and the hotel attributes. Furthermore, current studies have 
not estimated systems of both supply and demand at the aggregate level. A few studies do exist 
that examine demand-related issues controlling for hotel differentiation and geographic 
markets. Hiemstra and Ismail (1990, 1993) found that the price elasticity of demand varied 
across hotel segments’ room rates, using two samples of aggregate data divided into categories 
of high- and low-priced hotels. They estimated that the price elasticity of demand was -.35 for 
low- priced properties and -.57 for high-priced properties. In addition, they found that the 
estimated parameters varied relative to a geographic market’s population. Damonte, Domke-
Damonte, and Morse (1998) found that the price elasticity of demand varied using aggregate 
county-level data for two adjacent counties: Columbia County recorded a significant price 
elasticity of demand of between —0.8 and —1.8, while Charleston County’s price elasticity of 
demand was insignificant between —0.1 and —0.3. Note the wide range of estimates and the 
difference in the estimates across the two locations. 
Using property-level data in major metropolitan locations, Canina and Carvell (2005) 
found that demand is price inelastic, and price elasticity measures vary across market 
segments. The authors control for quality differences by analyzing the effects of income, 
consumer confidence, own price, and cross prices by market price segment. They report that 
the price elasticity was about —0.14 across market segments and ranged from —0.31 to —0.11 
by market segment. This is the only study that estimates the price elasticity at the hotel level. 
While their results show that demand is price inelastic, their estimates apply only to urban 
hotels in major metropolitan markets in the United States, and their elasticity estimates may 
not be applicable to other markets or countries. However, their results indicate that price 
discounts may not enhance revenues because the price elasticity of demand is inelastic. The 
inconclusive findings and gaps in previous literature indicate that a study that focuses on pricing 
behavior of individual hotels and examines local market competitors is an important addition to 
our understanding by offering a more plausible approach to examining firm behavior. 
Method 
Sample 
The focus of this study is on individual hotels and their direct competitors in local 
European markets. In cooperation with Smith Travel Research (STR), we explored pricing 
behavior using 3,042 hotel observations over the two- year period, from 2006 through 2007. 
The sample size changed from year to year, ranging from 1,409 (in 2006) to 1,633 (in 2007) 
hotels. 
We obtained monthly property-level data along with the corresponding competitive set 
data for each of the two years from STR Global (a subsidiary of STR). All dollar-denominated 
variables were supplied in U.S. dollars. 
Variables 
The key variables of interest in this study are the percentage differences between each 
hotel and its competitive set of hotels on price, demand, and revenue metrics. Annual ADR, 
occupancy, and RevPAR were computed for each property in the sample and each property’s 
competitive set. The percentage difference in ADR was used as the basis for making 
comparisons among the pricing strategies of hotels relative to their competitive set. To 
calculate percentage difference in ADR, the annual ADR of a competitive set was subtracted 
from the annual ADR of each hotel and compared to the annual ADR of the competitive set, 
expressed as a percentage. For example, if a specific hotel had an annual ADR of $50.00, and 
the annual ADR of the competitive set was $60.00, the percentage difference would be —16.7 
percent ([$50.00—$60.00/$60.00] x 100). As rates charged by the hotel in this example were 
lower than those of its competition, we would say that the percentage difference in ADR was 
negative, and the hotel’s $50.00 price represents a difference of 16.7 percent below its 
competitive set. The percentage differences in RevPAR and occupancy were also computed and 
graphed to show the impact of pricing differences among competitors on both occupancy and 
RevPAR. The relevant competitors for inclusion in a given hotel’s competitive set were 
determined by the individual hotels that provided their competitive set choices to the data 
provider. We relied on the individual hotel’s selection of competitors for this study. 
Data Analysis 
Data were analyzed on a yearly basis rather than on a monthly basis to minimize pricing 
irregularities that may have occurred in a particular month that are not representative of the 
property’s overall pricing strategy (Ismail, Dalbor, & Mills, 2002). We aggregated monthly room 
data for the property and competitive set to arrive at the annual number of rooms sold, annual 
number of rooms available, and annual rooms revenue for each property and for each 
property’s competitive set for each year. The data provider requires a minimum of four 
properties to constitute a competitive set. The relevant competitors were determined by the 
individual hotels that provided their competitive set choices. The data were broken down into 
various subgrouping by market segment and country for additional analysis. Properties that had 
less than 12 months of data were eliminated from the sample. 
To provide a conservative test of comparative pricing behavior, we eliminated any hotel 
types with unique demand configurations (e.g., extended-stay or resort hotels). It is important 
that the performance of a given hotel is comparable to that of its competitive set; otherwise, 
the study may error on the side of comparing substantially different types of hotels. To ensure 
the results were not driven by noncompetitors, we also excluded properties that were not 
comparable performers. Noncomparable properties were defined as those properties in which 
the absolute value of the percentage difference in RevPAR exceeded one standard deviation 
from zero in the preceding year. All properties in which the percentage difference of RevPAR 
exceeds one standard deviation for the prior year were eliminated from the study. All data 
were examined in U.S. dollars. Finally, the pricing strategy of a given hotel in a given year was 
categorized into 1 of 10 groups based on the percentage difference in ADR. These pricing 
strategy groups ranged from a category of 30 percent lower than the competitive set to a group 
that priced 30 percent higher. The steps in data transformation are summarized below: 
 Step 1: Exclusions - Excluded extended-stay and resort hotels. Eliminated hotels with 
less than 12 months of data. 
 Step 2: Performance outliers - Eliminated hotels that were not comparable to 
competitive set. Performance outliers are those in which the percentage difference in 
annual RevPAR for the preceding year exceeded one standard deviation from zero. 
 Step 3: Pricing strategy categories - Categorized hotels into groups based on percentage 
differences in ADR relative to the hotel’s competitive set. Range of up to 30 percent 
lower or higher than competitor. 
Findings and Discussion 
European Overall Effects 
The initial analyses (Fig. 1) show the average percentage difference in occupancy and 
RevPAR performance across hotels that raised or lowered their ADRs compared to their 
competition. Overall, for hotels that dropped their price relative to their competitive set, 
average percentage differences in occupancies were higher, but average percentage 
differences in RevPARs were lower compared to their competition. This pattern of higher 
occupancy but lower RevPARs when pricing lower than competitors was true for hotels in both 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. RevPAR and Occupancy percentage Differences from the Competitive Set for European 
Hotels 2006-2007 
years. The maximum occupancy advantage over the competitive set was obtained by those 
hotels that had the lowest comparative ADRs. Hotels that raised their relative prices by less 
than 5 percent experienced both occupancy and RevPAR gains relative to their competitors. 
Furthermore, higher comparative RevPARs were experienced by hotels with slightly higher 
versus slightly lower competitive prices. Hotels that raised their relative prices more than 5 
percent above the competition were punished with lower occupancies, but rewarded with 
higher relative revenue. 
Results by Market Segments 
Hotels are typically categorized into broad price and quality bands including the 
categories of luxury, upper upscale, upscale, midscale (full service), midscale (limited service), 
and economy hotels. These market segments vary on amenities, facilities, and services with 
associated rates. We examined the pricing dynamics of competitor hotels serving higher market 
segments of the industry, followed by lower end hotels. 
As shown in Fig. 2, occupancies decline with rising comparative rate strategies for luxury 
hotels. Hotels that price above the competition lose occupancy, but they have solid RevPAR 
gains. For luxury hotels, occupancy gains from lower prices are not as great as they are for 
upper upscale or upscale hotels. Both occupancy and RevPAR rise for the upper upscale 
segment that price between 0 and 5 percent above their competitors. Relative occupancies 
decline for upscale hotels only when they price 2-5 percent above the competition. The upper 
upscale and upscale hotels that priced above their competitors experienced higher comparative 
RevPAR performance, while this pattern was true for the luxury hotels that priced over 2 
percent above competitors. The market segment with the largest percentage gains in 
occupancy and RevPAR varied from one price category to the next (see Fig. 2). 
Midscale and economy hotels gain substantial occupancy by lowering their prices 
relative to the competition. On average, occupancy gains are greater than gains for hotels in 
the higher end segments. This finding may be due to the relative price sensitivity of the lower 
end segment consumers as compared to the price sensitivity of the higher end segment 
consumers. For hotels in these segments that price 15-30 percent lower than their competitors, 
the occupancy gains are substantially higher than the gains obtained by higher end hotels that 
price lower than their competitors. Clearly, lower end hotels can use lower prices to stimulate 
market demand. As Fig. 3 shows, this market share benefit yields substantially lower RevPARs - 
10.52-12.24 percent lower than their market competitors. Economy hotels that price between 
2 percent below and above their competitors also lose occupancy. Gains in RevPAR are only 
experienced when economy hotels price over 5 percent above competitors. Overall, falling 
occupancies and rising RevPARs are the norm for hotels that price above their competition in 
the midscale and economy segments. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. RevPAR and Occupancy Percentage Differences for European Luxury, Upper Upscale and 
Upscale Hotels Compared to the Competitive Set 2006-2007 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. RevPAR and Occupancy Percentage Differences for European Midscale and Economy 
Hotels Compared to the Competitive Set 2006-2007 
Country-Level Pricing Strategies 
Not all parts of Europe have similar market dynamics, and for that reason, our final 
analysis explores specific countries separately. To determine whether unique pricing strategies 
exist in different countries, we analyzed the results separately for the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Sweden, Spain, and Italy. The results for the United Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden 
are shown in Figs. 4-6. The patterns in the graphs of both the percentage difference in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. United Kingdom PevPAR and Occupancy Percentage Differences from the Competitive 
Set 2006-2007 
occupancy and the RevPAR are similar for each of these countries and to those of the 
overall sample. Figs. 7 and 8 show the pattern of occupancy and RevPAR differences in Spain 
and Italy. As the figures suggest, both Spain and Italy have pricing behavior among competitors 
that is different from that in Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The primary 
differences across countries rests in the degree to which occupancies decline with modest 
pricing below the competition (0-2 percent below the competition) and occupancies rise with 
modest pricing above the competition (0-2 percent above) and even greater pricing above the 
competition (5- 10 percent above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Germany RevPAR and Occupancy Percentage Differences from the Competitive Set 2006-
2007. 
Comparing the occupancy and the RevPAR differences for the five pricing categories in 
which hotels price below their competitive groups, the data show that pricing below the 
competitive set results in a consistent pattern of relative occupancy gains and RevPAR losses for 
Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom and Germany are the most 
similar. These markets are the most sensitive to comparative occupancy gains from lower 
prices, but also the market with the highest RevPAR losses from discounting (except in the 15-
30 percent lower pricing category). Hotels in Sweden experienced the most modest occupancy 
gains from pricing below the competitive set. In Spain and Italy, the patterns reveal that 
offering prices 2-5 percent below competitors can have positive effects on both occupancy and 
RevPAR in Spain, and modest comparative RevPAR losses in Italy. These unusual patterns 
compared to other countries in Europe, as well as results in both Asia and the United States, 
may suggest some unusual pricing dynamics in these countries (see Enz, Canina, & Lomanno,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Sweden RevPAR and Occupancy Percentage Differences from the Competitive Set 2006-
2007. 
2009 for a detailed discussion of similar findings in the United States). In the United States, 
Asia, and other European countries, price discounting leads to increases in occupancy and 
decreases in RevPAR compared to the competition (Enz et al., 2009). When prices rise, 
occupancies decline, but are more than offset by increases in RevPAR. For Spain, this result 
holds with a few exceptions. We observe that in Spain, on average, hotels that discount by 
between 2 and 5 percent compared to their competitors obtain an occupancy advantage of 
6.62 percent as well as a RevPAR benefit of 3.16 percent. Hotels that have a price premium of 
0-2 percent achieve both a positive percentage difference in occupancy and RevPAR. Similar 
results are observed in Italy for hotels that price 0-2 percent above their competitors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Spain RevPAR and Occupancy Percentage Differences from the Competitive Set 2006-
2007 
Supplementary Analysis 
To explore the impact of a price reduction on a given hotel’s RevPAR, we took all hotels 
that priced below their competitors in 2006 and calculated the difference in their own RevPAR 
performance between 2006 and 2007 under two conditions: (1) similar pricing strategies in 
both years compared to competitors and (2) changed pricing strategy from discounting relative 
to the competition to even further price discounting in 2007 relative to 2006. The results 
summarized in Table 1 indicate that when hotels change their pricing strategy by lowering even 
further their prices compared to the competition in 2007, they do not obtain the same RevPAR 
performance as when they keep their competitive pricing strategy the same from 2006 to 2007. 
This data shows that lowering relative prices further produces lower RevPARs for their 
properties. For example, hotels that priced 1 percent below their competitors in 2006 and 
dropped their relative prices in 2007 to 7.5 percent below the competition had an annual 
RevPAR gain of $12.91 compared to a gain of $17.64 for operators who did not drop prices 
further. This additional analysis shows that the greater the discounting in 2007, the lower the 
RevPAR performance of the discounting hotel compared to hotels that maintained relative rate 
integrity during the two-year period of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Italy PevPAR and Occupancy Percentage Differences from the Competitive Set 2006-2007  
Observations for Practitioners 
After looking at the pricing behavior of European hotels over a two-year time horizon, a few 
practical observations can be offered to operators. Offering guests prices that are lower than the 
competition does lead to higher occupancy percentages for the discounting hotel, but these 
comparatively lower prices also result in lower RevPAR performance than the competition. In 
contrast, hotels that price higher than their competitors have higher RevPARs, especially when they 
price significantly higher than their competitors. It is also possible that less loyal customers trade 
down to lower market segments. This possibility looks to be greatest for customers of luxury hotels 
because the occupancy declines for upscale and upper upscale hotels that price 5-10 percent above 
their competitors are modest. As a guide for operators, the best way to have higher revenue 
performance than your competitors is to have higher rates. A hotel should not drop price below the 
price of its true competitors if it wishes to enjoy a RevPAR premium. Very small differences were 
found across market segments or years in this study, and the general pattern of results was 
consistent. Pricing above your direct competitors yield higher rooms revenue while pricing below 
your competitors does not stimulate sufficient demand to give the needed revenue boost hoped 
for. This pattern is more volatile in Spain and Italy, perhaps due to strong tour group and forward 
booking patterns in these countries. Guests of luxury hotels appear to be less sensitive to price 
discounting while customers of economy hotels are quite sensitive to small price increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Relative Pricing Strategies in 2006 and 2007 for Hotels that Price below Their 
Competitors 
Conclusions 
The results of this chapter are relevant for competitive pricing decisions. They offer 
insights into the impact on occupancy and RevPAR of competitive pricing strategies. The 
findings revealed a pattern of relationships between competitive price differences, and the 
comparisons of occupancy levels and RevPAR performance, all within a competitive system 
based on operator- selected direct competitors. The analysis does not reveal the optimal 
pricing strategy or the impact of price changes on overall demand and RevPAR. Rather, the 
study shows the impact of competitive price changes on relative demand and relative RevPAR. 
However, the supplemental analysis does suggest that hotels that discounted in 2007 yielded 
lower RevPAR gains than did hotels that maintained their 2006 pricing strategy. 
To evaluate optimal pricing and the impact of price changes models of supply, demand 
and profitability costs are required. While this study did not offer this approach, in future 
studies, a methodology needs to be developed that is capable of estimating measures of the 
own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand for hotels by market segment and location 
using property-level data. This needed approach to understanding pricing is complex due to the 
heterogeneity within local markets and differences in competitive conditions across markets 
and countries in terms of both supply and demand factors. As a result, it is important to control 
for the degree and variety of supply competitiveness, as well as the differences in the 
characteristics and preferences of consumers differ across market segments, geographical 
locations, and time. While this is a nontrivial task, it is worthy of further consideration in future 
empirical investigations. 
Each manager, owner, and chain executive will need to decide on their own how to deal 
with the challenges of pricing in a difficult market and the revenue versus market share trade-
off, keeping in mind that hotels in the industry may be at the mercy of their dumbest 
competitor if they follow a path of price discounting. One hotelier put it this way, “When 
people break ranks it makes you look expensive. You obviously can’t have a cartel, but it also 
makes it difficult to put rates back up” (Manson, 2009). Furthermore, given the transparency of 
pricing today, you gain no competitive advantage by lowering your prices because your 
competitors know almost immediately about your strategy and can instantly match it 
(Lomanno, 2008). 
The results of this study should be comforting and confirming for any hotel operator 
who has resisted the pressure to drop prices below their competitors. This study is also 
reassuring for those who faced declining occupancy concerns from owners but maintained rate 
integrity and parity or higher prices relative to the competition. For those operations who could 
handle comparatively lower occupancies, the reward was higher RevPAR performance. It is our 
hope that by examining hotels that outperformed their competitive set because they choose 
not to discount that we can offer some sound facts to inform those who are puzzling over the 
discounting debate. 
Note 
1. The own-price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in quantity 
demanded given a percentage change in price. The cross-price elasticity of demand is 
defined as the percentage change in quantity demanded given a percentage change in the 
price of a different good. The income elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage 
change in quantity demanded given a percentage change in income. 
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